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Nelson v. Dist. Ct. (Nelson) - 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 14 (Apr. 1, 2021)1 
 




 Based on the plain language of EDCR 5.518, trusts may be parties to a divorce action. 
EDCR 5.518 is (1) mandatory upon request of a party, (2) it does not require the requester to make 
a prima facie showing of community interest, (3) and applies on remand. Thus, the court directed 
the court clerk to issue a writ of mandamus instructing the district court (1) to vacate its prior order 
which found the LSN and ELN Trusts were not parties to this action and (2) to impose a JPI over 
all trust property that remains subject to a claim of community interest, until the court makes a 
determination as to any community property.  
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
 During their marriage, Lynita S. Nelson and Eric L. Nelson, created two irrevocable self-
settled spendthrift trusts: the LSN Trust and the ELN Trust. Initially, the trusts were funded with 
separate property, but significant transfers happened between them during the marriage. Eric filed 
for divorce and requested a joint preliminary injunction (JPI) be issued under EDCR 5.518(a)(1), 
which enjoins the parties from transferring or selling community property or “any property that is 
the subject of a claim of community interest.” 
 
 In the divorce decree, the district court made findings regarding trust property and both 
parties appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court vacated parts of the decree and ordered the district 
court to trace trust assets to determine whether they were community property.2 On remand, Lynita 
moved to reinstate the JPI and the district court granted her motion in part, allowing it only to 
cover the two trust properties. Lynita moved for reconsideration to cover all property listed in the 
decree. The court denied this request because the ELN trust was not a party to the action and the 
JPI was only warranted for the two properties in which the ELN and LSN Trusts held ownership 
interests. Lynita’s appeal of this decision was denied for lack of jurisdiction. The preceding 
decision was based on Lynita’s petition for writ of mandamus directing the district court to impose 







1  By Mia Bacher 
2  Klabacka v. Nelson, 133 Nev. 164, 394 P.3d 940 (2017). 
Discussion 
 
Whether trusts may be parties under EDCR 5.518 
 
 Lynita argued that both the ELN and LSN Trusts are parties to this action and, more 
generally, that trusts may be parties to an action under EDCR 5.518. While Eric conceded the ELN 
Trust was joined as a necessary party, he argued only people may be parties under EDCR 5.518 
and a JPI is improper over property in a spendthrift trust.   
 
 The court first looked at the plain language of ECDR 5.518, which states “[u]pon the 
request of any party… a preliminary injunction will be issued by the clerk against the parties to 
the action or enjoining them and their officers, agents, servants, employees, or a person in active 
concert or participation with them.” Under EDCR 1.12(f), a person “must include and apply to 
corporations, firms, associations and all other entities, as well as natural persons” and NRS 0.039 
has an even broader definition which includes “a natural person, any forms of business or social 
organization and any other nongovernmental legal entity including, but not limited to, a 
corporation, partnership, association, trust or unincorporated organization. Additionally, the court 
has previously held that a trust may be a party to a lawsuit through its trustee.3 Thus, under the 
plain language of the rules, a trust may be a party under EDCR 5.518. 
 
 Here, Eric and Lynita stipulated and agreed that the ELN and LSN Trusts would be joined 
as necessary parties. For this reason, the court held that the Trusts are parties to this action. The 
court also held that EDCR 5.518 applies to trusts. 
 
Whether a joint preliminary injunction is proper here under EDCR 5.518 
 
 Lynita argued that EDCR 5.518 is mandatory and that the district court was required to 
issue a JPI upon her request. Eric argued that (1) Lynita needed first present a prima facie case that 
community property exists in order to get a JPI, (2) that a district court is not required to reinstate 
a JPI after a divorce decree even if it is ultimately remanded, and (3) that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion here to not re-issue a JPI.  
 
 The court agreed with Lynita and held that EDCR 5.518 is mandatory, citing Nelson v. 
Nelson.4 Despite this, Eric still contended that Lynita was required to make a prima facie showing 
that the trusts contained community property before the court was required to impose the JPI. The 
court disagreed, noting that EDCR 5.518 has no language indicating a prima facie showing of 
community interest exists prior to the issuing of a JPI. Rather, the rule requires a JPI upon request 
 
3  Causey v. Carpenters S. Nec. Vacation Tr., 95 Nev. 609, 610, 600 P.2d 244, 245 (1979). 
4  136 Nev. Adv. Op. 36, 466 P.3d 1249, 1252 (2020). 
of a party on any property subject to a “claim” of community interest. Thus, as long as there is a 
claim of community interest, a JPI must be imposed upon request. 
 
 Next, the court noted that in Klabacka v. Nelson it recognized assets within the LSN and 
ELN Trusts may contain community property and remanded the case for tracing of trust assets to 
determine whether community property was transferred into or comingled within the trusts. Thus, 
the holding of Klabacka demonstrated that at the time of the divorce decree, the Trusts may have 
included property with a claim of community interest. Because of this claim of community interest, 
the district court must impose a JPI over all the trust property.  
 
 Finally, the court addressed Eric’s argument that EDCR 5.518 does not not require 
reinstatement of a prior JPI after final judgment even if the case is ultimately remanded. The court 
noted that in Klabacka, they vacated part of the divorce decree and remanded it for further 
proceedings. Once the decree was partially vacated and remanded, there was no longer a final 




The court granted Lynita’s petition and directed the court clerk to issue a writ of mandamus 
instructing the district court to vacate its order to the extent it found that the LSN and ELN Trusts 
were not parties to this action and to impose a JPI over all trust property that remains subject to a 
claim of community interest, until the court makes a determination as to any community property.  
 
 
5  See Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996 P.2d 416, 417 (2000). 
